Common Good, Public Good, Common Interest

I use the phrase “common good” in opposition to individual rights in the previous post because some term must be used, and “common good” comprehends other phrases with related meanings. The Federalists and Anti-Federalists themselves did use this phrase, but they also spoke of the “public” or “general” good, the “common,” “public” or “general” welfare and the “common,” “public” or “general”  interest, etc.  Although these phrases are all related, clearly they can potentially signify vastly different—even opposing—notions.

If one accepts the context of the modern scholarship described in the previous post one would think that references to the “common good” would have classical republican connotations and link back to pre-modern political philosophy; “Publick good” perhaps contains elements of both republicanism and liberalism; and “common,” “general” or “publick” interest would seem to possess a definite liberal connotation and bear some relation to early modern political philosophy.

On the face of it, obviously, if one speaks of a common interest instead of a common good, one might very well be replacing a concern for what is good and evil with a concern for unifying self-interests.  Instead of speaking about what is truly good in common, one might be speaking about a collection of selfish desires that are in truth only accidentally considered common in that they do not have the same object.  On the other hand, it is not inconceivable that one could understand common interest as referring to the common good itself if one thought that interests rightly understood are satisfied by the common good.

There is less of a potential difference between a public and a common good, although “public” is more limiting than “common.” Things that are public are, by definition, common in a specific manner, whereas not all things that are common are necessarily considered or said to be public. More specifically, by labeling a good public one is implicitly calling attention to the fact that the good you refer to isn’t a private good.  “Public” generally indicates a relation to society, the citizenry, or government and our actions in light of them that “common” does not necessarily imply.

The distinction between public and private in the context of the end of government is not mere semantics.  For instance, one might conceivably hold that we all have a common human nature and thus we have a common purpose or end in life, but neither our nature nor our purpose should be properly called public.  Modern scholarship maintains that one of the tenets of “classical republicanism” is that human fulfillment is found ultimately in public action, or as part of the polis.  This is but one example of the fundamental difference to one’s understanding of government and its purpose the private vs. public distinction might make.

Based on my experience with the ratification debates, I would bet that “public good,” carrying the private vs. public distinction within it, is the phrase most frequently employed by the many participants in the ratification debates.  Yet “common” and “public” good are much more closely related to each other than they are to “common” or “public” interest.” One of the meanings of “Publick” in Samuel Johnson’s 18th century dictionary was “Regarding not private interest, but the good of the community.” Thus there is also a clear overlap between all three phrases.

Two other frequently used, relevant words in relation to the end of government are “welfare” (sometimes “common” or “public,” etc.) and happiness (sometime “public,” “national,” or “of the people,” etc.). Generally, the meaning of welfare is interchangeable with happiness—Samuel Johnson’s dictionary lists “Happiness” as the first meaning of the word. Yet the second and third meanings of “welfare” are “success” and “prosperity,” so one might take “welfare” to mean happiness with a slight emphasis on material well being. Still, happiness and its promotion among the people or public of the individual states, all the states together, or just in general is to my mind connected with the older, classical notion of the common good, in which happiness is understood to be achieved by becoming good or attaining what is good in common.  Although welfare and happiness are referred to as the end of government frequently, it is rare to find a participant in the ratification debates talking about individual happiness or anything of the sort.  Quite the contrary: happiness and welfare are almost always discussed insofar as they are “general” or shared. In order to be happy one must desire and obtain what is truly good, or at least that was the understanding still attached to the word at the time of the ratification debates.  Further, even upon a superficial glance at the texts happiness seems to signify something more than material well being.  Happiness or its variants are usually spoken of in the same breath as “safety” or something similar as an end of government in such a way as to make clear that happiness or welfare refers to something more than, or higher than, safety or material well being.

Linguistic and etymological nuance aside, of course, all of the above terms could be used by an author who adopts either political philosophy. Even assuming all that I have sketched above contains some element of truth, for instance, a writer could easily use any one of the terms used above and actually mean what another of the terms above better signifies. It is conceivable that an Anti-Federalist writer could say that the proposed constitution should promote the common interest in an off-hand, general comment, but in the rest of his essay deny the central tenets of classical liberalism.  One might say, for instance, that it is in our common interest to be virtuous and good. Conversely, another writer could say that the proposed constitution must promote the common good in passing, but in the rest of his essay embrace classical liberalism. One might say, for instance, that our common good is intrinsically related to commerce alone and is achieved strictly through the promotion of material prosperity.  One might say the common good is only common insofar as everyone ought to be allowed to decide what is good for themselves.

We ought to be wary for such loose fitting speech since, after all, the participants of the ratification debates were not writing carefully thought out philosophical treatises, but political rhetoric, often hastily written in the heat of bitter and even personal debates.  In this context, all of these related phrases point in some way, however vague, to a shared reason and purpose for the existence of government.  A purpose which is to be distinguished from the protection of individual rights as an end of government (even if the two goals are related).